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I. Introduction
Free speech case law permits the government to impose a
wide range of restrictions on a similarly wide variety of forms of
speech. Even if we were all to agree on the precise purposes of,
or functions served by the free speech clause, as well as on what
constitutes speech in the first place, correctly deciding many
cases involving government restriction of speech would still be
unavoidably difficult. This is because no plausible approach to
defining the limits on governmental power to restrict speech can
avoid controversial valuations or attempts to foresee the future
consequences of deciding a case in a particular way.
But the unavoidable difficulty of some free speech cases
does not, by itself, explain why the legal tests or doctrines ap-
plied should be as complex and multifaceted as they are. There
is no reason in principle why admittedly difficult problems are
necessarily better adjudicated by relatively complex tests.1
Free speech doctrine tends toward excessive, unjustified
complexity for several reasons. The first is the fallacy that diffi-
cult problems are necessarily best resolved judicially through
complex formulas. Second, our legal culture may place such a
high value on freedom of speech that a judicial standard requir-
ing a government seeking to restrict speech to meet a series of
conjunctive requirements may be adopted so as to drive addi-
tional nails into the coffin of improper government regulation of
t Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. My
thanks to Professor David Smolin for his willingness to discuss some of the issues pro-
voked by this Article.
1. For a sense of the fallacy of assuming that difficult legal problems are invariably
met optimally by highly nuanced, multifactor judicial tests, see Epstein, The Risks of
Risk/Utility, 48 OHio ST. L.J. 469 (1987).
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private speech. Finally, the decision making dynamics of multi-
member courts, in which voting coalitions must be patched to-
gether in a potentially unstable fashion, may encourage a pro-
cess in which the particular concerns of various individual
justices are more or less mechanically aggregated, rather than
critically distilled, into a compound formula commanding the
agreement of a majority. Thus, a judge will join a coalition if his
own concerns are incorporated, however awkwardly, into the ul-
timate formulation of the legal test rather than leave the coali-
tion on the ground that the new formulation is now unnecessa-
rily complex, poorly focused, or unwieldy. This will result in
unnecessarily complex tests with overlapping elements and no
single unifying theme or rationale.
This Article documents the unnecessary complexity of the
judicial formulations most frequently used in resolving the most
common kinds of free speech cases. It is suggested that free
speech cases are often dubiously decided because of the sheer
distraction of considerations that are really tangential to justify-
ing restrictions on speech. Therefore, this Article recommends a
more concentrated judicial focus on free speech cases. The bet-
ter analysis measures the gains and losses in the fulfillment of
the purposes underlying the free speech clause, both from the
subjective standpoint of the speaker and from the standpoint of
other affected parties. These gains or losses due to governmental
regulation of speech should be the central judicial concern. They
should be measured in light of the purposes underlying the free
speech clause, focusing particularly on the value of the options
or choices available to speakers and their audiences before and
after implementation of the governmental regulation in ques-
tion.
One important implication of this approach is if a regula-
tion does not impair a speaker's ability to pursue her own free
speech values, because it leaves open to her some channel other
than the one being regulated, then the speaker cannot cogently
claim a violation of her free speech rights. This is so even if the
government acted with a malicious or repressive intent, failed to
substantially further any legitimate state interest, or failed to
tailor its regulations so that there would be the least amount of
impingement on the number, variety, or range of speech chan-
nels available to the speaker. Similarly, even if the speaker
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strongly prefers, for extraneous reasons, to use her original
means of speaking without the government regulation, the pres-
ence of an adequate alternative channel renders the speaker's
free speech claim baseless.
Adjudicating free speech cases will admittedly remain diffi-
cult, even after all distracting considerations are set aside. This
Article will consider the unavoidable difficulties of determining
when speech and speech-related activity partially disserve free
speech values by taking on a broadly coercive character or by
abandoning the goal of persuasion altogether. This Article will
also briefly address some difficult issues of burden of proof and
standard of appellate review in free speech cases. To illustrate
and clarify the approach recommended above, this Article will
focus in particular on the troubling issues involved in restric-
tions on picketing in residential neighborhoods. As will be
demonstrated, the simplified approach suggested in this Article
generates reasonably sensitive results in a parsimonious way,
while minimizing distractions and any need for recourse to futile
judicial attempts to balance the right of free speech against a
right to privacy.
II. The Complexity of Free Speech Test Formulations
Over the past forty years or so, free speech jurisprudence
has spawned concepts and categories of varying scope and di-
mension. Thus, it has become common for the courts to distin-
guish between time, place, and manner restrictions on speech
and absolute bans;2 between content-based and content-neutral
restrictions;' between viewpoint-based and viewpoint-neutral re-
strictions;' and between direct and incidental burdens on
speech.' The courts have also developed tests for governmental
2. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 115-17
(1987).
4. See, e.g., Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 189, 197-200 (1983).
5. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977).
See also Stone, supra note 3, at 115 (observing that in City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47,
the Court analyzed the zoning restriction at issue as content-neutral because it was justi-
fied in terms of preventing negative secondary effects of the regulated theaters, even
though the ordinance on its face was restricted only to theaters showing movies empha-
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restrictions on commercial speech, for symbolic conduct or
mixed speech and conduct cases,7 as well as for regulating
speech in various kinds of government forums.8 Central to many
of the judicially developed tests for the legitimacy of speech reg-
ulations are concerns for the furtherance of some governmental
interest, as well as for whether the governmental interest is be-
ing pursued by only narrowly tailored means or by the available
means least restrictive of freedom of speech.' Often, but hardly
invariably, the test formulation incorporates a concern for the
alternative speech channels, or the remaining unimpaired means
of communicating, left to the speaker burdened by the regula-
tion. This concern, however, is at most considered to be only one
of several relevant inquiries.'0
This Article develops the thesis that an inquiry into the
available channels or media of speech left open to the speaker,
suitably developed and refined, should do most of the work in
free speech jurisprudence. The other distinctions, tests, and fac-
tors typically do not even pull their own weight. Beyond their
unavoidable doctrinal imprecision and confusion, many of these
considerations lead to an improper analytical focus, introduce
unnecessary arbitrariness and unpredictability, and invariably
raise more subsidiary questions than they answer.
A. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
To begin to illustrate these effects, we may consider one of
the most frequently encountered and logically inclusive catego-
ries - that of governmental restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of speech. A governmental restriction on speech is a
time, place, or manner restriction if it does not absolutely ban
the restricted speech activity in question.1" Of course, time,
sizing sexual activity, an obviously content-based distinction).
6. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563-66 (1980).
7. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
8. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983).
9. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-94
(1984).
10. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2501-02 (1988).
11. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986); Tollis, Inc.
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place, and manner restrictions will sometimes verge upon, if not
be practically tantamount to, an absolute ban."2 At some point
along the continuum, the time, place, and manner regulations
undeniably become severe enough to be equivalent in effect to a
well-enforced ban on the speech activity in question.'8 There-
fore, it is hardly clear why much of the consequence should turn
on the distinction between time, place, and manner restrictions
and absolute prohibitions, or why different legal tests should be
applied to these two categories. From a practical standpoint, the
more crucial distinction would be between relatively modest
time, place, and manner restrictions on the one hand, and rela-
tively severe or burdensome time, place, and manner restrictions
as well as absolute bans on the other.
Of course, we may care about factors other than the degree
of severity of the restriction. Under the rubric of freedom of
speech, we may also be concerned with the distribution of the
burden, or the differential impact, of a speech restriction. Time,
place, and manner restrictions as well as absolute bans both may
be based on or motivated by a desire to suppress or disadvan-
tage one side in an ongoing debate. Put somewhat differently,
the distinction between content-neutral and content-based re-
strictions cuts across the distinction between time, place, and
manner restrictions and absolute bans. 4 Our initial feeling may
be that absolute bans are generally more suspicious than time,
place, and manner restrictions. Still, it is far from clear why
even an absolute ban on a particular form of expression that is
motivated or justified by considerations irrelevant to the content
or viewpoint of the speech should be given more exacting judi-
cial scrutiny than a time, place, and manner restriction that is
plainly intended solely to muzzle opposition to a government
policy.
v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987).
12. The various time, place, and manner restrictions, in their cumulative effect,
might have approached an absolute ban in the Nazi protest march case of Colin v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199-1202 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
13. See Colin, 578 F.2d at 1201-02.
14. See, e.g., City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47 (classifying the ordinance in question
as a time, place, and manner restriction, but going on to consider its character as con-
tent-neutral or content-based).
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1. The Time, Place, and Manner Analysis
The purpose of maintaining the time, place, and manner
distinction has never been clarified, partly because of the contin-
uing lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court as to the
precise standards for adjudicating these restrictions. 5 Typically,
though, the courts work through a time, place, and manner re-
striction in the following manner. The court first determines
whether the time, place, and manner restriction is content-based
or content-neutral.16 If the restriction is deemed content-neutral,
the court considers whether the restriction serves,'7 or is
designed to serve,' 8 a significant 9 or substantial20 governmental
interest. Whether a regulation actually serves, or even is
designed to serve, a given interest will often be a largely specula-
tive inquiry inviting courts to uphold or strike down the regula-
tion by unconsciously manipulating the level of rigor, magni-
tude, and concreteness with which the service of the interest
must be shown. Even if a regulation serves a sufficiently weighty
governmental interest, there then remains the issue of whether
the regulation is sufficiently "narrowly tailored" in serving that
interest, and whether the sufficiency of the tailoring is judged by
relatively demanding2' or lax2" standards. Finally, if the regula-
15. See City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1551 (7th Cir.
1986), aff'd mem., 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987) (noting the split in the circuits, and lack of
decisive Supreme Court guidance, on the standards applicable to restrictions on residen-
tial solicitation). At the Supreme Court level, Justice White, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor point to developing authority which suggests that the tailoring of con-
tent-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions for the purpose of governmental regula-
tion has been treated stringently by some circuits and leniently by others. See 107 S. Ct.
at 920 (White, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 3, at 115-17.
17. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(referring to a test of serving the public interest or purpose, rather than merely being
intended to serve it).
18. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (referring to design or intention behind the
restriction).
19. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (characterizing the required governmental interest as
"significant").
20. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (adopting a formulation of "substantial" govern-
mental interest).
21. See City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1553 (7th Cir.
1986), aff'd mer., 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987) (imposing a stringent "least restrictive" govern-
mental means test). See also ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 818-19 (8th Cir.
1983); New York City Unemployed and Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 232, 237
(2d Cir. 1982).
22. See City of Watseka, 107 S. Ct. at 920 (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting a least
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tion has passed muster on the preceding requirements, the court
often, but not invariably,23 goes on to impose the further re-
quirement either that the speaker be left with one or more alter-
native channels" ' with which to disseminate her message, or that
the remaining alternative means of speaking not be unreasona-
bly limited. 5 The courts are unfortunately divided not merely as
to the verbal formulation of the inquiry into alternative speech
channels. They are also substantively divided on the question of
how one measures the constitutional adequacy of an alternative
speech channel and on the degree to which the alternative chan-
nel must be available, either formally or realistically to the
speaker.2 6 Working through some of these problems, and estab-
lishing why it is important to do so, is central to this Article.
The time, place, and manner inquiry, which is of doubtful
utility itself, engenders a series of derivative inquiries which are
themselves of limited value. After it is determined that the
speech restriction goes to time, place, and manner, the court
then determines whether the restriction is content-based or con-
tent-neutral," a distinction that surprisingly often sparks con-
troversy in particular cases, and tells us very little.2 8 As this dis-
restrictive means test for narrow tailoring (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 293-94)).
23. See Brezenoff, 677 F.2d at 236-40 (not requiring the availability of adequate
alternative speech channels).
24. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (requiring as one element the availability of alterna-
tive speech channels); see also Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 797 (3d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983).
25. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). Crucially,
this Article examines the limitations on alternative speech channels not in terms of their
general desirability, but by their relative attractiveness in terms of widely recognized free
speech purposes or values. These values are often thought to include the pursuit of (po-
litical) truth, promotion of the democratic process of self-governance, and promotion of
individual self-realization. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 54 (D. Spitz ed. 1975); Stone, Con-
tent Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 193. These and similar aims
or functions will be referred to herein as "free speech values."
26. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47.
28. The content-neutral versus content-based restriction distinction has been criti-
cized on grounds compatible with, but essentially distinct from, the thesis of this Article.
In Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 206
(1982), the content-neutrality rule is viewed as too broad to reflect the recognition that
different kinds of speech may have greater or lesser constitutional value. Furthermore,
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tinction has evolved, the courts must consider the predominant
purpose of the ordinance.2 9 Determining the governmental
body's predominant purpose, particularly in the absence of legis-
lative history, is of course an inquiry fraught with difficulty.30
2. Restrictions on Primary Versus Secondary Effects of
Speech
Once the predominant purpose of the regulation is somehow
judicially ascertained, the court then asks whether such purpose
is aimed at the content of the speech in question, or instead at
the "secondary effects" of the speech"1 in such a way that the
regulation is justified, without reference to the content of the
speech.3 2 Thus, a restriction that is intended to prevent persons
from considering or adopting what the legislature considers fal-
lacious ideas is a content-based restriction; whereas, a restriction
that is intended to allow, for example, residential homeowners to
sleep undisturbed, or to be spared the expense of picking up
mountains of leaflets discarded in the streets, is aimed at the"secondary effects" of the speech. This means that we cannot
know, without further investigation, whether a statute that by
its express terms restricts only speech promoting, for example,
conservative Republicanism, is content-neutral or not, since we
do not yet know the legislature's predominant intent, or what
secondary effect, if any, of conservative Republican speech it
had in mind.
and even more implacably in Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REv. 113, 114, 140-41 (1981) the content distinction is theoretically
and practically untenable and should be abandoned.
29. See, e.g., Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir.
1987); Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 808 F.2d 1331, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1986)
(interpreting the Court's language in City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48).
30. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 533 (1983).
31. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. A "secondary effect" of speech might be, for
example, an alleged increase in crime attributed to the presence of "speech" of one or
more porno shops in a downtown area. Id. at 48; see also Christy v. City of Ann Arbor,
824 F.2d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1987). Another illustration is the increase in auto accidents
associated with distracting highway billboards. Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways,
822 F.2d 586, 594-95 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 702 (1988).
32. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48; Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053,
1058-59 (9th Cir. 1986). This approach to content neutrality is criticized as too speech-
restrictive in Stone, supra note 3, at 115-17 n.5.
33. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
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However the courts conceive of content-neutrality, the con-
cept will often be difficult to apply, even if the courts satisfacto-
rily determine the predominant legislative intent."' Distinguish-
ing a primary from a secondary effect of a restriction is probably
more difficult than is commonly recognized. In Linmark Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,"5 for example, the Court
confronted the constitutionality of a ban on residential "For
Sale" signs. The Court held that under the circumstances, in-
cluding the community's desire to prevent "panic" home sales
and maintain a racial balance in the community, the ban was
content-based." This may seem correct, on the Court's theory
that the community "proscribed particular kinds of signs . ..
because it fear[ed] their 'primary' effect - [i.e. seeing them] will
cause those receiving the information to act upon it."'3 7 But on
reflection, it is far from obvious why the ordinance could not be
equally well described as aimed predominantly at secondary ef-
fects. The community is not attempting to keep apart willing
buyers and sellers who would otherwise be brought together by
the signs. There is no allegedly dangerous or controversial idea
that the community seeks to suppress. The community may sim-
ply be attempting to prevent the kind of "panic" selling that
may be irrational from the general standpoint of buyers, sellers,
and all segments of the community. It may be that rapidly
changing community demographics, attributable to "panic" sell-
ing, is regarded as undesirable by all concerned persons. If so,
the community ordinance seems more aptly characterized as
aimed at a secondary effect.
To take another example, forbidding the construction of
temporary structures such as anti-apartheid shanties on college
campuses, based upon the presumed secondary effect of prevent-
ing aesthetic injuries, constitutes another sort of apparently easy
case. 8 But one might argue that if a student group constructs an
34. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 28, at 139-42 (discussing the application of the con-
tent distinction to Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). For the arguments raised by
the opposing parties, see Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 589 (6th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 702 (1988).
35. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
36. Id. at 94.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir.
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anti-apartheid shanty, it may be difficult to show that the aes-
thetic justification for removing the shanty is wholly indepen-
dent of everyone's reactions to the merits of the view being ex-
pressed. If the community were deeply, emotionally convinced of
the merits of the anti-apartheid message, would it so readily
view the shanty as an aesthetic affront that befouls the land-
scape? Suppose a family lived in a building designed after the
fashion of Thomas Jefferson's Rotunda, and a child had built a
tree house in the yard - would a neutral passerby be likely to
find the tree house an aesthetic affront?
One might argue, however, that anti-apartheid protesters
waive such an issue because they invariably stipulate that the
shanty is meant to be ugly, that it is intended to evoke an ar-
resting contrast between the squalor of those persons disen-
franchised under apartheid and the privilege and splendor sur-
rounding the shanty. This response, even if it establishes
convincingly that the regulation is content-neutral as applied,
merely further illustrates the point that a content-neutral regu-
lation may well have a disproportionate, if not devastating, ef-
fect on one side of a political debate, while leaving the opposing
side essentially untouched.39 In this context, poorer groups must
resort to noisier, messier, more disruptive means of communicat-
ing than wealthier groups.4 Content-neutrality may thus be
neutral in form, but in practical effect it is predictably biased in
its consequences against particular groups and their associated
viewpoints.
From the standpoint of this Article, however, the overriding
criticism of the content-neutrality category is not that it fails
the test of general ideological neutrality, but that the concept
suffers from an equal and opposite flaw of essential indetermi-
nateness. Knowing that a particular regulation of speech is con-
tent-neutral tells us very little about the laxity or rigor by which
the regulation will be judged, and gives us little ground for pre-
1988).
39. For a balanced discussion of this criticism, see Stone, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 199.
40. Thus, it is hardly coincidental that the group barred from sleeping in public
parks favored greater, rather than lesser, attention toward resource expenditure on the
problem of homelessness. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984).
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dicting whether the regulation will be upheld or struck down.41
Instead, the fundamental flaw of the content-neutrality inquiry
is its almost complete insensitivity to what should genuinely
matter in free speech adjudication. Dean Stone has provided a
comprehensive taxonomy of four distinct formulations of the le-
gal standards applicable to content-neutral restrictions on
speech.42 Each formulation can be supported by recent Supreme
Court authority.3 The four formulations emphasize the consid-
erations of reasonableness, broad interest balancing the weight
of the government's interest, and the breadth or narrowness of
the regulation's incursion into otherwise protected speech, in
light of the regulation's purpose." Of these four formulations,
only one considers the availability of alternative means of com-
municating for the speaker affected by the regulation. 5 On the
approach taken in this Article and discussed at greater length
below, this single consideration, suitably defined and elaborated,
is of predominant importance. 0
3. Content-Based Restrictions
The courts are generally suspicious of content-based restric-
tions,47 and are inclined to include restrictions based on the sub-
41. Contrast the broad range of content-neutral test standards, virtually as broad as
the full spectrum of all speech tests, from the most lax to the most demanding, collected
in Stone, supra note 3, at 48-50.
42. See id.
43. See Stone, supra note 3, at 49-50 & nn.7-13.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 49 ("[s]ome content-neutral restrictions are constitutional if 'they are
designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit al-
ternative avenues of communication' "). Note that this test should conceivably be met by
a merely "substantial" governmental interest where the speaker is, under the circum-
stances, left with no practically usable means of conveying her message.
46. For but a single example of the tendency to minimize or exclude altogether any
consideration of the relative or absolute value of the speech channels left unimpaired by
the regulation, or of the difference between the speaker's or the intended audience's po-
sition before and after the regulation, see United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-88
(1985). While Albertini refers to "incidental" impacts on speech, presumably this is
meant to cover virtually any impact on speech that stems, indirectly, from a content-
neutral restriction. See id.; M.J.M. Exhibitors, Inc. v. Stern (In re G. & A. Books, Inc.),
770 F.2d 288, 296 (2d Cir. 1985). Of course, an impact on speech that is incidental in this
sense could also be quite substantial, or even effectively muzzle a given speaker under
particular circumstances.
47. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
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ject matter under discussion," while often singling out restric-
tions based on the viewpoint of the speaker as being of central
concern."9 Even if it is assumed, however, that content-based re-
strictions tend to be more dangerous to free speech than con-
tent-neutral restrictions, judicial suspicion of content-based re-
strictions is only imperfectly focused. Put simply, there does not
seem to be any particularly severe danger to free speech if an
admittedly content-based restriction, whether or not it is nar-
rowly tailored to affect its purpose, leaves fully available to the
speaker the best practical means, from the speaker's standpoint,
of promoting the speaker's message, without impairing the pur-
poses or values underlying the free speech clause from the
standpoint of other affected parties.
If the courts determine that because a given regulation
leaves the speaker's primary free speech channels essentially
unimpaired, the regulation has no significant practical effect on
what we have referred to as free speech values. Thus, the courts
should be extremely reluctant to strike the regulation down as
unconstitutional, let alone apply a heightened, content-based
test in doing so. If the regulation does not impair free speech
values, it verges on an accusation of legislative incompetence
and infidelity to basic governmental principles justifying the
courts in applying heightened scrutiny to the regulation. The in-
clination of the courts to ignore this logic stems from the preoc-
cupation, in content-based speech restriction cases, with dis-
tracting inquiries into the importance of the state interest and
into the tailoring of the restriction to the state interest."
Focusing on the content-based nature of the speech restric-
tion, as opposed to the free speech value of alternative speech
channels, led to an odd analysis in Regan v. Time, Inc. 1 Regan
involved a challenge to federal statutes making it a crime to
photograph United States currency except where certain condi-
48. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1980).
49. See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49.
50. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988) (content-based restriction
on political speech in a public forum).
51. 468 U.S. 641 (1984). The photograph at issue in this case appeared on the front
cover of Sports Illustrated and depicted $100 bills falling through a basketball hoop. See
also City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1552 (7th Cir. 1986),
aff'd mem., 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987).
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tions were met and where the photograph was intended for pub-
lication "'for philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or
newsworthy purposes in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or
albums .... , ",52 The Court found this "purpose" restriction un-
constitutional merely because it determined that the restriction
permitted the government to discriminate on the basis of con-
tent; that is, photographic reproduction of currency in connec-
tion with "newsworthy" articles would be permitted, whereas
photographs not falling under this or any other exception would
be prohibited. 3
The Court thus struck down the purpose exception peremp-
torily as content-based. Even if this result itself is defensible,
the analysis seems misfocused. Even the most controversial dis-
tinction under the statute, between newsworthiness and non-
newsworthiness, is hardly foreign to constitutional adjudica-
tion."' Furthermore, the Court did not pretend to detect any
substantial pro government bias in the distinction itself, nor did
it find that the distinction significantly correlated with particu-
lar viewpoints. In light of the purposes underlying the free
speech clause, it would have been natural and appropriate for
the Court to have considered whether the statutory restrictions
on photographs of United States currency left the speakers with
alternative modes of conveying their intended message, provided
those modes were not significantly disadvantageous in promot-
ing the recognizable free speech values of the affected persons.
To oversimplify, could Time make whatever point it intended to
make essentially as well without violating the statute? If so, as
seems intuitively likely, it is far from clear why the purpose re-
striction should be said to violate the free speech clause.
52. 468 U.S. at 644 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 504(1) (1982)).
53. Id. at 648-49. For example, the Court did not rely on the argument that the
newsworthiness distinction was too difficult to make, or that the content discrimination
could somehow be related to any viewpoint-based discrimination or bias.
54. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)
(relying on a distinction between matters of public concern and those not of public con-
cern in the libel law context); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (relying on the same
distinction, but in a public employee dismissal case).
1989]
PACE LAW REVIEW
4. Narrow Tailoring
To this point, the analysis has in fact understated the com-
plexity, manipulability, uncertainty, and even arbitrary irrele-
vance of much contemporary free speech law. Time, place, and
manner restrictions must not only serve some significant or sub-
stantial governmental interest, but they must do so with some
degree of effectiveness in a way that is more or less narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. To suggest that the Court has
provided less than consistent guidance in this area is not a mat-
ter of descending to linguistic quibbling. There is a substantial
practical difference between a narrow-tailoring rule, requiring
merely that the restriction strike directly at the precise evil in
question, and a rule requiring that the government employ the
means of striking at the evil that is least restrictive of freedom
of speech.
The Court's equivocal direction in this respect is undenia-
ble,55 and it has resulted in inconsistent decisions at the circuit
court level."' Thus, while the Court "has required 'narrow tailor-
ing' even within the area of content-neutral regulations, it is not
clear what level of exactitude is appropriate.""7 At times the
Court has seemed to adopt a stringent requirement that the re-
striction be the least speech-restrictive means of practicably"
achieving the government purpose. 9 At other times, the narrow-
55. See SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1988) (discuss-
ing the Court's apparent variations in this area).
56. See id. at 1275 (contrasting Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 797-
98 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983) (narrow tailoring always met if an
ample range of alternative speech channels is available) with ACORN v. City of Fron-
tenac, 714 F.2d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1983)(narrow tailoring requires use of least restrictive
means)).
57. SDJ, Inc., 837 F.2d at 1275-76.
58. The restriction on speech is not typically held defective because a conceivably
less restrictive alternative exists. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688 (1985).
59. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980) (imposing requirement that the restrictions serve the state interests "without un-
necessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms" and noting the availability of
"less intrusive" measures). A similarly stringent least restrictive means test may be logi-
cally implied from the language of Justice Stevens' enunciation that regulations be "nec-
essary" to further the governmental interest. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976) (Stevens, J., for the plurality). See also City of Watseka v.
Illinois Pub. Action Council, 107 S. Ct. 919, 920 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1054 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
[Vol. 9:57
1989] ALTERNATIVE SPEECH CHANNELS
tailoring requirement is deemed met if the restriction aims at
and directly promotes the governmental interest ° or promotes
that interest more than would be possible in the absence of the
regulation,6" or "if it targets and eliminates no more than the
exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy.""
The more exacting "least restrictive means" formulation of
the narrow-tailoring requirement is sometimes criticized as be-
ing virtually impossible to meet.6 3 While this fear is overstated, 4
the test does seem susceptible to judicial manipulation, con-
scious or unconscious, in that a court in a nondeferential mood
may simply pronounce itself unconvinced by the evidence that
all less restrictive means have been ruled out. A court can always
point out that the government has failed to take some further
issue or objection into consideration, thereby second-guessing a
complex policy decision undertaken by an elected body familiar
with relevant local circumstances.6 '
The less stringent formulations of the narrow-tailoring re-
quirements are also questionable, however. Requiring only that
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988); M.J.M. Exhibitors, Inc. v. Stern (In re G. & A. Books,
Inc.), 770 F.2d 288, 298 (2d Cir. 1985).
60. See SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1988); Pennsylva-
nia Alliance for Jobs and Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1984).
61. See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
62. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2502 (1988) (citing City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10 (1984)). The Supreme Court majority in Frisby thus
reflected the distinction drawn by Judge Coffey, dissenting at the Seventh Circuit level,
between a least restrictive means test and a precise responsiveness to the problem test
for narrow tailoring. See Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1367 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated,
818 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1987), dist. ct. judgment reinstated and remanded, 822 F.2d 642
(7th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (reaff'g 619 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Wis. 1985)), rev'd, 108 S. Ct.
2495 (1988).
63. See City of Watseka, 796 F.2d at 1564 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
64. See, e.g., New York City Unemployed and Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677
F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1982) ("least restrictive efficient method" test successfully met by
the government restriction).
65. For arguable instances of such judicial second-guessing, see e.g., Schultz v.
Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated, 818 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1987), dist. ct.
judgment reinstated and remanded, 822 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc), (reaff'g 619
F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Wis. 1985)), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988); City of Watseka v. Illinois
Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1555-56 (7th Cir. 1986); ACORN v. City of Fron-
tenac, 714 F.2d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1983). For an example of judicial disinclination to
second-guess the issue of narrow tailoring, see Students Against Apartheid Coalition v.
O'Neil, 838 F.2d 735, 736-37 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (anti-apartheid shanty barred
on university grounds, but no consideration given to whether aesthetic interests could be
served just as well by allowing the structures for a brief period of time).
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the regulation promote the governmental interest more effec-
tively than would be the case in the absence of the regulation 6
could, by itself, lead to very harsh results. Such a test, for exam-
ple, could justify the government's enacting some hideously se-
vere regulation on the ground that even a draconian regulation
would promote the governmental interest better than no regula-
tion at all. Of course, an unduly severe regulation might be
struck down on some other element of the free speech test as
applied. 7 The point, however, is that an unduly oppressive and
needless restriction on speech, even if it qualifies under the less
stringent formulation, is the very antithesis of "narrowly tai-
lored" in any literal sense.
Requiring instead that the regulation target and eliminate
no more than the precise evil in question, or its source,"8 is also
problematic. This formulation fails to recognize that if one has a
choice between using either a sledge hammer or a fly swatter in
dispatching a group of insects, there is a sense in which the
sledge hammer, because of its relatively severe effects on the
flooring, is not narrowly tailored for the job, even if the hitting
surface area of the hammer and the fly swatter are equal and no
greater than necessary. If, for example, a government were to
narrowly target the problem of campaign literature littering by
imposing strict liability in the form of a mandatory ten-year
prison sentence on the campaign organizers, such a criminal
statute, while perhaps being aimed at the precise problem, could
well be unduly burdensome on free speech rights because of its
excessive repercussions on the conduct and activities of cam-
paign organizers. The view that "an ordinance is sufficiently well
tailored if it effectively promotes the government's stated inter-
est"69 endorses not only the unnecessary use of sledge hammers,
but also the use of unnecessarily large sledge hammers as long as
they are effective.
Although it should be possible to settle on a single, most
66. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
67. An unduly severe regulation might, for example, be suspected of being an at-
tempt to suppress the idea or point of view being advocated, thus engendering extremely
strict judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
48 (1986).
68. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2502 (1988).
69. SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1988).
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popular version of the narrow tailoring requirement, this would
leave the central problem untouched. No matter how it is formu-
lated, the concept of narrow tailoring is inconsequential from
the standpoint of promoting the purposes underlying the free
speech clause. The breadth or narrowness of a regulation and its
impact on speech activities is one thing, while the extent to
which the speaker can effectively express her message, or pursue
free speech values despite the regulation, is quite another.70 It is
perhaps debatable whether these two inquiries are "closely re-
lated, 71 but it clearly goes too far to suggest that they are
nearly equivalent.72
One way of illustrating the distinction between a narrow-
tailoring requirement and an analysis focusing on available al-
ternative speech channels is to note that a government restric-
tion on speech might not approach being narrowly tailored on
any formulation, and yet might leave open a wide range of valu-
able, effective alternative channels, that are superior to the
channels that are regulated. A government regulation might, for
example, severely burden or prohibit free speech avenues A and
B, where the regulation is either ineffective, or could accomplish
its purposes just as well by regulating only avenue A. The same
regulation could leave free speech channels C and D entirely
unimpaired which are in all respects the best options available
to the speaker and to all affected parties.
A regulation, therefore, might not be narrowly tailored, but
might well leave open the best free speech channels. Accord-
ingly, if those superior channels are left unimpaired, that should
normally be the end of the inquiry. Despite the lack of narrow
70. For the distinction between these two inquiries, see e.g., City of Watseka v. Illi-
nois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1577 n.4 (7th Cir. 1986) (Coffey, J., dissenting)
(citing Wisconsin Action Coalition v. City of Kenosha, 767 F.2d 1248, 1254 n.3 (7th Cir.
1985)) (least restrictive means test focuses on government's alternatives while speech
channels analysis focuses on speaker's alternatives).
71. Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1350 n.25 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated, 818 F.2d
1284 (7th Cir. 1987), dist. ct. judgment reinstated and remanded, 822 F.2d 642 (7th Cir.
1987) (en banc) (reaff'g 619 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Wis. 1985)), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
72. But cf. Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298, 308
n.6 (1984) (finding little difference between the time, place, and manner restrictions as
opposed to the four-factor standard used in the draft-card burning case of O'Brien v.
United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which notably does not incorporate any consideration
of any alternative means of communicating left open to the speaker).
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tailoring, there would be no cognizable harm from the stand-
point of free speech values." Free speech tests that concern
themselves centrally with any form of narrow tailoring are thus
misfocused. Free speech tests that require some form of narrow
tailoring, but ignore entirely any question of available alterna-
tive speech channels left open to the speaker,7" are even more
seriously flawed for the reasons discussed above.
5. Burden of Proof Analysis
There are certain unresolved problems that attend not only
approaches emphasizing narrow tailoring, but also those, as is
argued for in this Article, that rely almost exclusively on alter-
native speech channel analysis. For example, to the extent that
either of these approaches is less than crisply objective, 75 the le-
gal standard of review on appeal becomes important. Currently,
the standard of review to be applied to trial court findings of
fact in free speech cases, in which the trial court struck down
the restrictions as unconstitutional, is particularly controver-
sial.76 Similarly, there are difficult burden of proof issues associ-
73. Speakers are often motivated to speak in particular formats for reasons other
than to most effectively, or most cost-effectively, promote their views in a manner that
also promotes the free speech values of oneself or others. As this Article will discuss
below, it may well be the case that a speaker objects vehemently to a regulation that
deprives her of only those means of speaking she knows to be relatively undesirable or
cost-ineffective from a free speech value standpoint. One might, for example, prefer a
particular kind of picketing not for any advantage in promoting free speech values from
one's own perspective, but because that kind of picketing combines speaking out with a
great ability to coerce unwilling, unconvinced targets to act in accordance with one's will.
The test for restrictions on commercial speech, mixed speech, and symbolic conduct tend
to require narrow tailoring while ignoring the presence of alternative speech channels.
74. See, e.g., the test formulations in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980); Fox v. Board of Trustees, 841 F.2d 1207,
1213 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051,
1052 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988) (making no reference to alter-
native speech channels in a commercial speech test); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376-77 (1968) (mixed speech and conduct case which makes no reference to any
greater restriction on free speech rights than is essential, with no express or implied
concern for the alternative speech channels left open to the speaker); Clark v. Commu-
nity For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (discussing O'Brien standard).
75. See, e.g., Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1986) (specu-
lative conclusions on fulfillment of the regulatory purpose).
76. See Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 108 S. Ct. 1280-81 (1988)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See also Lindsay v. City of San Antonio,
821 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 707 (1988); Schultz v.
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ated with both the narrow tailoring and alternative speech chan-
nels inquiries. The courts have been seriously split on whether
the government or the challenging speaker should bear the bur-
den of proof on the issue of narrow tailoring. "I Allocating the
burden of proof on the issue of narrow tailoring is inherently
difficult because, while the government will generally be in a
better position to offer evidence on this point, courts may well
be reluctant to saddle governments with the often practically
impossible task of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
why some slightly narrower, less speech-burdensome regulation
would not have been equally effective in promoting the statutory
goal. In a range of cases, such a burden on the government
would be nearly impossible to meet.78
Allocating the burden of proof on the issue of the sufficiency
of the remaining alternative speech channels is admittedly also a
matter of controversy. The Court has appeared to place the
practical burden of showing the constitutional adequacy of the
alternative speech channels on the government."" Dean Stone
has noted that an opposite approach, requiring speakers to show
the insufficiency of the remaining alternatives, tends to result in
Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1341 n.14 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988). But cf.
Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975)
("[tirial court findings - including those involving constitutional rights - may not be
set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous"); Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wash. 2d
212, 220-21, 721 P.2d 918, 924 (1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987) (sub-
stantial evidence standard applied on appellate review of fact under state law even
though trial court had imposed restrictions on freedom of speech).
77. Compare, e.g., Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th
Cir. 1987) (burden on government) and ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 818,
818 n.6 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74
(1981)) (same) and New York City Unemployed and Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677
F.2d 232, 240-41 (2d Cir. 1982) (same) with Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater,
829 F.2d 1051, 1054 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988) (citing Harnish
v. Manatee County, 783 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1986)) (placing the burden on the
speaker) and M.J.M. Exhibitors, Inc. v. Stern (In re G. & A. Books, Inc.), 770 F.2d 288,
298 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
78. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Commissioner of Highways, 822 F.2d 586, 590 (6th Cir.
1987) (regulation permitting off-premises urban area signs if they are "more than 660
feet from the interstate highway").
79. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 819-20 (1984). See also
Pennsylvania Alliance For Jobs and Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 193 (3d
Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)).
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decisions against the speaker, at least in close cases."0
We, as a society, may so fear deciding free speech cases in-
correctly against the speaker, that this fear alone dictates the
placement of the burden of proof on this issue. Avoiding govern-
mental inroads on free speech is important, but the similarly im-
portant goal of preventing racial discrimination by the govern-
ment has not led the courts to require the government to prove
its own nondiscriminatory intent.8 On the issue of the adequacy
of alternative channels, logic suggests that the burden of proof
belongs at the most crucial point on the speaker. This should
not be disturbing, because the reason for allocating the burden
to the speaker on this issue actually reflects our sensitivity to
the speaker's own free speech interests. While neither the gov-
ernment nor the speaker is generally in a superior position to
bring forth evidence on the free speech case as a whole, the
speaker will generally be in a much better position to cast light
on the issue of the adequacy of the alternative speech channels.
This is because the court is centrally concerned with the ade-
quacy of the speaker's alternatives, and with their availability to
the particular speaker. The court must focus on the relevant free
speech values from the subjective perspective of the parties in-
volved. It may be, for example, that an alternative of distribut-
ing leaflets is, for the particular speaker, infeasible, inherently
distortive of her message, or not suited to her target audience.
All of this is peculiarly within the knowledge of the speaker and
a matter of conjecture for the government. While the speaker
should not be required to address in turn the inadequacy of the
infinite number of distinct alternative ways in which she might
conceivably communicate her message, she should be required to
show the inadequacy, from her own standpoint, of any plausible
alternative channels affirmatively suggested by the government,
with the government also being responsible for such matters as
showing that the speaker's own preferred channel involves im-
pairing the free speech values of third parties.
80. See Stone, supra note 3, at 80.
81. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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III. Focusing on the Adequacy of Alternative Channels
In the contexts discussed above, as well as in others,82 the
courts improperly de-emphasize or even ignore the availability
or lack of availability of alternative channels that are as advan-
tageous to the speaker's own free speech values as the channel
being restricted.8 3 Unnecessary complexity and misfocused anal-
ysis results. Disencumbering free speech analysis of the distrac-
tions discussed above and focusing on alternative speech chan-
nels restores proper focus and reduces analytical complexity.
Free speech law, however, even then retains some unavoida-
ble analytical complexity. The government cannot and should
not be permitted to successfully defend its regulation merely on
the ground that some sort of alternative speech channel, of
whatever quality or practicality exists. While the case law is
clear that the government may not simply point to some techni-
cally available alternative speech channels in support of its regu-
lation, 5 it is not clear how much this means beyond a rejection
of some universal rule that an ability to exercise one's speech
rights in "some other place" invariably suffices.8" On such a
82. In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), for
example, the Court discussed the tests for restrictions on speech in both traditional or
"quintessential" public fora and in limited purpose or "designated" public fora. It re-
ferred to the availability of ample alternatives for the speaker as only one factor among
several in connection with the "quintessential" public fora, and did not refer at all to the
availability of alternative channels in connection with "designated" public fora, although
it confusingly suggested that the tests were meant to be the same in this regard. Id. at
45-46.
83. Again, the fact that a speaker chooses a speech medium or combination of medi-
ums that is "free speech value inferior" even from her own standpoint does not imply
overall irrationality on her part. See supra note 73.
84. See Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (1988); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 n.10 (1980).
85. See supra note 84.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 185 (1983) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (statute requiring protester to move across the street
from the Supreme Court if she wished to display a sign); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-78 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Were I a resident of
Mount Ephraim, I would not expect my right to attend the theater or purchase a novel
to be contingent upon the availability of such opportunities in 'nearby' Philadelphia, a
community in whose decisions I would have no political voice."); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 n.15 (1976)
("We are aware of no general principle that freedom of speech may be abridged when the
speaker's listeners could come by his message by some other means such as seeking him
out and asking him what it is."); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
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broad theory, unpopular speakers could be vexatiously chased
across the country from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, impairing
their ability to speak effectively.
On the other hand, it is unclear why a regulation denying
the use of a particular square foot of sidewalk, or requiring
protesters to move an inconsequential six inches to the left,
could not be so trivial in its effects on the speaker's free speech
values"1 that the regulation could not be upheld without consid-
eration of any other extraneous factors. Just as a particular book
may be constitutionally protected in one urban bookstore but
not in another,"8 so the Court has sensibly considered whether a
speaker can speak in "another" place in passing on the constitu-
tionality of a regulation preventing her from speaking in some
designated place. In Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,"9 for example, the Court consid-
ered, among other factors, whether alternative forums were
available to the speaker.90 The Court explicitly observed that the
challenged restrictions on solicitations at the state fairgrounds
did not prevent the respondents from engaging in their commu-
nicative activity "anywhere outside the fairgrounds."91 The gov-
ernment is thus plainly not invariably barred from the plea that
the regulated party may speak in "some other place."' 2
Constitutionally adequate alternative speech channels, how-
ever, will not always be realistically available. 3 It is even possi-
556 (1975) (apparently no equally good theater available for musical); Spence v. Wash-
ington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974) (quoting the widely cited language from Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some
other place."). See also ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1983).
87. For reference to the most commonly accepted free speech values, see supra note
25. See also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 878-79 (1963) and, for a slightly different perspective, Blasi, The Checking Value in
the First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 521.
88. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977) (patent offensiveness
of an allegedly obscene work must be measured by contemporary community standards).
89. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
90. Id. at 654-55.
91. Id. at 655.
92. Note the tension between this result and the broad language in Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("one is not to have . . . his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.").
93. The Court has rightly focused on the realistic, as opposed to the merely formalis-
tic, availability of alternative channels. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1893
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ble for a government regulation to be narrowly tailored, or to be
the least restrictive means for attaining the legislative goal,
without ensuring that a speaker is left with any adequate alter-
native speech channels. The least restrictive means test, there-
fore, cannot be generally described as a "more stringent"94 test
than the alternative speech channels test.
A. Evaluating the Adequacy of Alternative Speech Channels
Evaluating the constitutional adequacy of an alternative
speech channel would take the following form. Just as each
speaker may have "a variety of speech interests""' that may re-
quire consideration, so reasonable speakers may wish to consider
more than one dimension of the adequacy or inadequacy of po-
tential alternative speech channels, insofar as each dimension
bears on each speech interest. These dimensions might include
the size of the actual or potential audience,9" the prestige of an
alternative channel,97 the "quality" or likely appreciativeness of
the audience reachable through an alternative channel, 8 finan-
cial cost, 99 flexibility of the alternative channels, 100 immediacy or
personalization of impact,101 and certainly the degree to which
the alternative permits greater articulation or detail of presenta-
tion.1 02 Thus, the courts should consider qualitative as well as
(1988); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977).
94. Pennsylvania Alliance For Jobs and Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182,
185 (3d Cir. 1984).
95. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For A Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
For reference to broader categories of speech interests, formulated as free speech values,
see supra note 25.
96. See Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1892 (1988); Tacynec v. City of Philadel-
phia, 687 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983).
97. Tacynec, 687 F.2d at 798.
98. See id. But see Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93
(1977) (perceived advantage in using "For Sale" signs to reach persons not actively seek-
ing sales information).
99. See, e.g., Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93; Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103,
1111 n.14 (5th Cir. 1987).
100. See Lindsay, 821 F.2d at 1111.
101. This factor should often be relevant in cases involving conscience-based resi-
dential picketing, as in Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988). See Stone, supra note 3,
at 79. But cf. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 820 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (some advantages of signs over more articulate handbills from a free
speech value standpoint).
102. Thus, a government regulation that prevents physicists from discussing, for ex-
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quantitative aspects of the available alternatives'" against the
backdrop, or baseline standard, of the relative free speech values
otherwise available in the absence of the government regulation.
The basic free speech values that will be involved, such as
the pursuit of truth, participation in the process of democratic
self-government, and self-realization, should be examined from
the subjective standpoint of the actors involved. It may go too
far, however, to give independent weight to the speaker's own
choice of means of speaking, merely because it is her own choice.
Although there will doubtless be some tendency for speakers to
choose effective rather than ineffective means of speaking," 4
courts should also consider the possibility that the speaker may
prefer one means of speaking rather than another for reasons
unrelated to, or which actually disserve, free speech values. A
speaker may seek a greater potential for sheer annoyance or co-
ercion of a captive, disfavored audience, or some other target of
her speech.105
Similarly, the courts should not give independent weight to
the speaker's choice of means merely on the ground that as the
speaker's own choice, that channel embodies and reflects the
speaker's interest in her own self-fulfillment or self-realiza-
tion.106 The courts should, where necessary, consider which of
two mediums better promotes self-realization in and through its
use, from the standpoint of the affected parties. They should not
ample, the feasibility of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or Star Wars defense
system, in technical articles, but permits them to use bumper stickers, buttons, placards,
and sandwich boards to express their skepticism, even at taxpayer expense, would be a
dramatic infringement on their free speech rights.
103. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803 n.23
(1984)(quantitative analysis); City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d
at 1547, 1553 (7th Cir. 1986) (qualitative analysis). It is clearly impossible as a general
rule to suppose that every significant restriction on speech will result in a lower quantity
of speech. Speakers may opt instead for the same or greater quantities of speech of
poorer "quality," or less precisely targeted speech. These possibilities are largely set
aside in Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 803 n.23. One occasionally relevant "second-
order" consideration would be the alternative's relative vulnerability to particularly sub-
tle, practically undetectable government censorship. See City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Pub. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2145-46 (1988) (newsracks versus pamphleteers).
104. See Stone, supra note 3, at 78.
105. See supra note 73.
106. See Stone, supra note 3, at 78 n.134 (citing various authorities); Linmark As-
socs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (vague reference to
"autonomy").
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assume, however, that free speech values are enhanced simply
by allowing persons to choose their own means of expression or
act as they please. This would amount to a dubious claim that
respect for free speech implies a broad conduct libertarianism. 07
Free speech does not necessarily imply laissez faire. On such a
libertarian view, respecting someone's decision to drive to work
rather than take a bus, would become a free speech matter be-
cause failing to respect that autonomous choice would impair
the value of self-realization or self-fulfillment.0 ' This line of ar-
gument is not to deny, of course, that certain means of speaking
may, under the circumstances, be more conducive to self-realiza-
tion than others in the course of use.10 9 Presumably, prayer and
fasting at a tyrant's doorstep, for example, may tend to promote
self-realization more than sticking an obscene bumper sticker on
one's vehicle.
Once the relevant considerations are clarified, alternative
speech channel analysis becomes a matter of proper application.
At this stage, a number of problems appear. One problem in-
volves the proper analysis of alternatives that are allegedly not
commercially viable. Although the financial cost or practical af-
fordability of an alternative will normally be considered in as-
sessing its adequacy, 110 the mere fact that, for example, the al-
ternative sites must be bid for by the speaker, or are already
occupied by tenants, does not render the sites necessarily inade-
quate."1 Speakers must presumably be prepared to compete in
the economic marketplace on the same terms as anyone else. It
goes too far, however, to suggest that the "economic impact" of
the restriction on the speaker is never a relevant issue." 2 There
will inevitably be difficult cases falling between the two ex-
107. See Wright, A Rationale From J.S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause, 1985 Sup.
CT. REV. 149, 160-61 n.41.
108. The appropriateness of confining free speech principles, short of a broad con-
duct libertarianism, is a recurring theme of F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY (1982).
109. Thus, researching and writing a treatise on American government may be more
self-fulfilling than wearing a campaign button.
110. See supra note 99.
111. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986); SDJ,
Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).
112. But see City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 54 (citing Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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tremes. While it will obviously be inadequate to inform a welfare
rights group that its sole alternative option is buying network
television time, it is not necessarily a speech restriction attribu-
table to the government if a particular group's message is so dis-
tasteful that it cannot profitably sell its literature from any com-
mercially zoned property. Governments do not necessarily
inhibit speech by failing to guarantee responsive markets."' The
cases between these two extremes are unavoidably fact-sensitive.
The touchstone must be an overall sense of whether, taking con-
cerns for free speech of all the affected parties into account (in-
cluding any ways in which the government regulation may actu-
ally enhance the free speech value of some affected person),
there has been a significant" 4 net diminution" 5 in free speech
values on the whole. Significantly, the burden of proof rests with
the speaker at the most crucial points." ' In close cases, this will
of course be a complex, difficult call. But it is useful to remem-
ber that this sort of judgment will amount to only a fraction of
the complexity and difficulty encountered with the currently en-
trenched free speech tests.
B. Adequate Alternatives and the Problem of Residential
Picketing
To illustrate this inquiry, it may be useful to discuss the
role of free speech value analysis and the analysis of available
alternative speech channels in the context of the conscientious
picketing of home residences by the use of public sidewalks or
public streets. In attempting to resolve such cases, the courts ap-
ply the sort of unnecessarily multifaceted tests discussed above,
113. Thus, the government does not necessarily violate the free speech clause by not
subsidizing, for example, pornography or fascist literature. There are, however, sufficient
consumers of each to enable the purveyors of both to pay their rent.
114. Presumably, insubstantial restrictions on freedom of speech, however burden-
some or objectionable they may be in other respects, are generally not actionable. See
Key, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 1986) (slight diminution in
effectiveness of erotic message, due to ten-foot separation requirement between dancers
and patrons, does not constitute significant impairment).
115. Of course, the diminution in free speech or in free speech values need not be
reduced to zero in order to be actionable. See, e.g., Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824
F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1987) (city may not set proportional limits on the percentage of
non-obscene erotic materials sold at bookstore).
116. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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but now are additionally encumbered by the complication of
public forum analysis. 117 The public forum doctrine, which is
controversial in this context," 8 begins by at least implicitly as-
suming that all public streets in all settings are presumptively
alike for free speech purposes, and that they are quintessential
public forums in the same category as public parks and public
sidewalks. 119
Perhaps some of the reluctance to categorize sidewalks in
front of downtown public buildings as public forums, but not to
categorize bucolic residential neighborhood lanes without side-
walks as such, stems from the fear that such a distinction"would represent a radical departure from the general direction
of first amendment jurisprudence. Such a holding would effec-
tively place vast areas of this country out of the reach of the
protection of the first amendment."'' 0 Of course, holding resi-
dential streets to be public forums does not guarantee protection
for all peaceable speech activity.' 2 ' It would not matter, how-
ever, from the standpoint of free speech values, whether a cer-
tain percentage of turf fell into a less protected category if all
speakers had perfectly adequate alternative speech forums read-
ily available to them. The genuine issue then, is whether re-
117. Criticism of the utility and focus of public forum analysis is found in Farber &
Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in
First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1223-24 (1984) (public forum doc-
trine often irrelevant, confusing, or crude); Stone, supra note 3, at 93. Occasionally, pub-
lic forum analysis can be simply bypassed. See, e.g., Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews
for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. 2568, 2571 (1987).
118. See, e.g., the obvious ambivalence of the court in Pursley v. City of Fayetteville,
820 F.2d 951, 955 n.5 (8th Cir. 1987); Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1361-66 (7th Cir.
1986) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (noting the interests in residential privacy and repose and
suggesting that the particular street in question was intended for vehicular traffic rather
than congregation and communication), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988). It is possible to
read such criticisms as suggesting that public forum analysis is either not useful or that
the street in question was either a limited-purpose public forum or a non-public forum.
See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1983).
119. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2500 (1988); Boos v. Barry, 108 S.
Ct. 1157, 1162 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Heffron v. Inter-
national Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981) (streets viewed
as places "where people may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors
in a relaxed environment."); Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 249, 721 P.2d 918, 939
(1986) (en banc) (Dore, J., dissenting), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987).
120. Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d at 1347, rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
121. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. at 2504.
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stricting someone's speech on a street or sidewalk leaves that
speaker with adequate alternative means, from the speaker's
own perspective, to convey her message.
In cases of residential picketing, however, the legal issue is
ordinarily stated as a matter of balancing the constitutional
right of speech or communication against a more amorphous,
but undoubtedly important, right of privacy.122 The approach
advocated herein, while treating some of the same considera-
tions, focuses a bit more manageably on the furtherance or
nonfurtherance of free speech values, and on the conflicts be-
tween these values. The analytical overlap of these approaches
stems in part from recognizing that while the private home may
be considered to be the locus of privacy or a safe haven,1 23 it
may also, relatedly, provide a crucial environment for reflec-
tion,124 which is in itself a vehicle for the exercise of free speech
values. 125
An approach to the problems inherent in residential neigh-
borhood picketing requires both a sensitivity to the particular
free speech values involved, especially from the distinctive
standpoint of the protester, and a recognition that perhaps not
every aspect of the protester's activity, or even of the protester's
speech, can be said to unequivocally promote free speech values.
A sensitivity to the free speech values embodied in the protester
may lead us to recognize that the alternatives of picketing at a
downtown business location, 26 communicating through "direct
mail, radio, television, newspapers or telephone,' ' 2 7 or even
122. See, e.g., Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?,
67 Nw. U.L. REV. 153, 154 (1972); Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d at 1351, rev'd, 108 S. Ct.
2495; Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 544 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971
(1975). For an intriguing case discussing the mailing list exclusion, see Rowan v. United
States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) and Farber, Content Regulation and
the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727, 750-52 (1980).
123. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
124. See id. at 489 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
125. John Stuart Mill emphasizes, for example, the indispensability of reflection and
deliberation in connection with his classic defense of freedom of speech. See ON LIBERTY,
supra note 25, at 41.
126. See, e.g., Pursley v. City of Fayetteville, 820 F.2d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 1987) (refer-
ring to district court opinion).
127. See Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1356 (7th Cir. 1986) (Coffey, J., dissent-
ing), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
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picketing in a less focused and concentrated manner in front of
the target's own residence 2 ' could conceivably represent a sig-
nificant impairment in free speech values of the protester. For
example, a pro-life picketer may, as a matter of conscience or
tactics, prefer not to reach large numbers of people with her
message,12 9 but instead to confront personally a physician who
performs abortions. Not all pro-life picketing, of course, will be
carried on this way, but doing so, rather than, for example, com-
municating through radio advertisements, is potentially fully le-
gitimate and may well be preferable from the point of view of
the protester's own free speech values.
On the other hand, certain aspects of a residential picketer's
tactics, even though they are preferred by the picketer, either
may not detectably advance free speech values, or may be posi-
tively inconsistent with free speech values, at least from the
standpoint of a target or victim. This concern would include not
just the familiar "captive audience" problem,"'0 but all attempts
to embarrass, inflict suffering, coerce, intimidate, or bully an un-
consenting1 3 1 target, directly or through adult or child1 32 third
128. See Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2501 (1988).
129. But cf. Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d at 1371 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (focusing in
this context on size of audience), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
130. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) and Haiman,
supra note 122, at 193-94. The "captive audience" problem pits the free speech values of
a willing speaker against those members of the audience who would prefer not to listen,
but have no means of physically leaving, such as a speaker at a bus depot.
131. While the target of picketers may generally be presumed to prefer that the
picketers leave, the issue of consent may perhaps be somewhat more problematic in the
case of residential picketing of high public officials. For a discussion of similar facts, see
Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975) and
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969). Gregory is discussed in Kamin, Residen-
tial Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 177 (1966). In his article,
Professor Kamin simply finds privacy rights to outweigh free speech rights in the context
of residential picketing of high officials, even if the "target" is the Mayor of Chicago. See
id. at 182-83. If the Court were to insist on this broad intuitive balancing, however, it
would have to take due account of the view, familiar from libel law cases, that public
officials voluntarily undertake the risk of exposure to certain sorts of abusive unpleasant-
ness. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
132. As a rule, speech or picketing involving complex emotional subjects aimed at
young children should be scrutinized for the possibility that the children are being used
simply as a means to coerce or intimidate the children's parents. See Schultz v. Frisby,
807 F.2d at 1366 & n.6 (Coffey, J., dissenting), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988). Such speech
could be, on balance, alien to or destructive of recognizable free speech values. See gen-
erally Wright, Free Speech Values, Public Schools, and the Role of Judicial Deference,
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parties, in ways that essentially "bypass" or ignore the process
of reasoned persuasion that appeals to the unencumbered judg-
ment of the target.
C. The Limited Utility of the Concept of Coercion
It may be tempting to suppose that the Court's concern for
free speech values requires that the residential picketer's"speech" or other activity be classified as itself impairing free
speech values if and only if the picketer's speech or other activ-
ity can be characterized as "coercive.' 133 The concept of coer-
cion, however, turns out to be both too amorphous and too con-
troversial to serve this role. While coercion as a concept is
helpful in free speech analysis because it can be generally distin-
guished from the process of reasoned persuasion' that is cen-
tral to free speech, 135 the question of whether coercion is itself
morally neutral has been left unclear by the literature.130 This is
a matter of some importance. If residential picketers contend
that their picketing is aimed at preventing moral evil or the vio-
lation of moral rights of others by their target, then on a moral-
ized conception of what coercion means, the picketers cannot be
said to be engaging in coercion, regardless of how extreme their
22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 59 (1987).
133. As this section establishes, no neutral, uncontroversial, consensual account of
what constitutes "coercion" is presently possible.
134. See, e.g., Gert, Coercion and Freedom, XIV NoMos: COERCION 30, 44-45 (J. Pen-
nock & J. Chapman eds. 1972).
135. See generally J.S. MEL, supra note 25.
136. For what seems to be a well-grounded, familiar approach, see Wolff, Is Coercion
Ethically Neutral?, XIV NoMos: COERCION 144, 146 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1972) ("[Cloercion is degrading. To coerce a man rather than persuade him is to treat
him as a thing governed by causes rather than a person guided by reasons."). However,
the philosophical literature is sharply divided on the extent to which the concept of coer-
cion has built into it a negative moral evaluation or a sense of prima facie unjus-
tifiability. Compare, e.g., Ryan, The Normative Concept of Coercion, 89 MIND 481, 483-
84 (1980) (no coercion if no violation of one's obligations or the rights of those acted
upon) and Carr, Coercion and Freedom, 25 AM. PHIL. Q. 59, 63 (1988) (a justifying moral
convention can render what would otherwise be coercive into noncoercive activity) with
A. WERTHEIMER, COERCION 188 (1987) (rejecting Ryan's approach in this regard) and Ly-
ons, Welcome Threats and Coercive Offers, 50 PHIL. 425, 427 (1975) (arguing that a per-
son might be coerced into acting fairly). Robert Nozick leaves open the degree to which
the concept of coercion necessarily refers to some moral baseline in NOZICK, COERCION,
PHILOSOPHv, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 447 (S. Morganbesser, P. Suppes, & M. White eds.
1969).
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tactics are.'87
Without presuming to resolve this issue of the status of co-
ercion, it seems clear that coercion in the context of residential
picketing will often involve the subversion and impairment of
the free speech values of the direct or indirect target of the coer-
cion, whether the attempted coercion is successful or not. 18
Even unsuccessful attempts at coercion could impair free speech
values from the standpoint of the target if, for example, the tar-
get is so tormented and distracted by the incessant din of the
picketing that she is unable to reflect on or reason about the
merits of the underlying issue raised by the picketers. The op-
portunity to reflect on and consider the merits of public or
moral issues is plainly central to various free speech values. 3 '
The recognition that coercive speech can substantially im-
pair the free speech values of a target, or that speech can be"persuasion bypassing," casts serious doubt on the Supreme
Court's repeated claim that speech that is coercive does not lose
its constitutionally protected character." 0 It is perfectly possible
to protect coercive speech in a given case on the ground that the
degree to which it impairs free speech values is minimal com-
pared with the degree to which it is expressive of other free
speech values, particularly those of the speaker. But this would,
if pushed too far, run contrary to our skepticism about permit-
ting a speaker unilaterally to redistribute free speech values in
his own favor, by analogy, that one's fist-swinging freedom
should end at a victim's nose. While public debate should doubt-
less be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,""' and while per-
137. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 136, at 483-84; Carr, supra note 136, at 63.
138. It is often argued that there is, in effect, no such thing as attempted but unsuc-
cessful coercion; that if the target does not comply with the would-be coercer's threat or
demand, then he has not been coerced, or even made subject to coercion. See, e.g.,
Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, XIV NoMos: COERCION 16, 17 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds. 1972); Gunderson, Threats and Coercion, 9 CAN. J. Pius. 247, 256 (1979) and other
authorities cited in Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion" - Virtue Words and Vice
Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541, 562 & n.79. Professor Westen himself thinks this approach is
inaccurate. See id. at 562. Attempted, but unsuccessful, coercion is in any event often
blameworthy. See Bayles, supra, at 19.
139. See supra note 25.
140. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909-11 (1982); Or-
ganization For a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
141. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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suasive, emotional, and even offensive 14 2 speech, as well as
purely descriptive 14 3 speech, are important to public debate,
these and similar considerations certainly do not support a
broad immunization of coercive speech.14 4
The crucial problem with focusing on the concept of coer-
cion, in this context, is its sufficiently inclusive character. A resi-
dential picketer might, for example, impair free speech values by
means other than coercion in any narrow sense of the term."'5
One might manipulate, or condition, or even socially pressure a
target into compliance, in a way that does not involve persuasion
and, in fact, impairs free speech values, without exercising coer-
cion as that term is normally understood."4 If a residential
picketer, by means other than coercion, can intentionally or
unintentionally undermine free speech values or the purposes
underlying the legal institution of freedom of speech, then an
analytical focus on coercion by speakers is necessarily too nar-
row. Thus, an analytical focus on alternative speech values,
while simple by comparison with established approaches to gov-
ernment regulation of speech, must not be oversimplified.
142. See, e.g., Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 911. See also VanDeveer, Coer-
cive Restraint of Offensive Actions, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIR 175, 188 (1979).
143. See, e.g., Bering v, SHARE, 106 Wash. 2d 212, 226, 721 P.2d 918, 927 (1986) (en
banc), cert. dismissed, 107 S. Ct. 940 (1987).
144. See Bering, 106 Wash. 2d at 258, 721 P.2d at 944 (Anderson, J., dissenting in
part) (persuasive speech as losing constitutional protection when it becomes coercive).
But cf. Kamin, supra note 131, at 212 (raising the possibility that simple distribution of
leaflets could be coercive if the leaflets were accepted because of the imposing bulk of the
person distributing them).
145. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 136, at 59 ("not all interferences with one's freedom
involve coercion"). Cf. Bering, 106 Wash. 2d at 219, 721 P.2d at 923 (picketing that
causes physicians and patients emotional distress and a substantial risk of physical and
mental harm is coercive).
146. See, e.g., McCloskey, Coercion: Its Nature and Significance, 18 S. J. PHIL. 335
(1980). But cf. Day, Threats, Officers, Law, Opinion and Liberty, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 257,
265 (1977) (including, i.e., threats and intimidation as coercive modes of influence, but
excluding punishment or deterrence from the category of coercion). The question of
whether there are circumstances in which making someone an "offer" could impair free
speech values is as intriguing as, but probably no more easily resolved than, the related
question of whether an "offer" could ever be coercive. See, e.g., Benditt, Threats and
Offers, 58 PERSONALIST 382, 383-84 (1977) (yes); Day, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. at 259 (offers not
curtailing liberty). For commentary on Benditt, see Richards, Acting Under Duress, 37
PHIL. Q. 21, 35-36 (1987); and Westen, supra note 138, at 570-71 nn.98 & 99. For ex-
tended discussion, see generally A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 136.
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IV. Conclusion
This Article has suggested that current free speech law is
unnecessarily complex, in ways that risk unnecessary arbitrari-
ness, unpredictability, and sheer manipulability of result. More
deeply, there is some risk that unnecessarily complex judicially
created free speech doctrine will eventually make it more diffi-
cult for ordinary citizens to comprehend or profoundly subscribe
to freedom of speech as an overriding important constitutional
value. 1 7 Whatever the magnitude of these risks, they need not
be taken. Focusing instead, as this Article has suggested, on the
availability or lack of alternative speech channels, from the
standpoint of the speaker and other affected parties, is itself an
adequate alternative to current free speech doctrine.
No free speech test formulation can be guaranteed to be im-
mune from judicial abuse for repressive ends, but the simpler
the test, the fewer the possibilities for disguising repressive ends.
By its nature, the practically-available-alternative-speech chan-
nel analysis above is both inescapably central to what we should
be preeminently concerned about in most free speech cases, and
inescapably formulated so as to discourage, rather than promote,
repression of disfavored ideas. For a governmental restriction of
speech to be sustained on this approach, there must in effect be
no constitutionally cognizable harm. In the absence of the gov-
ernment restriction on speech, the speaker will be able to pre-
sent a particular message in a particular way to a particular au-
dience, thereby promoting, from his own standpoint, if that of
no other person, such free speech values as the search for truth,
political participation, and self-realization.148 If the government
restriction is to be sustained on the theory discussed above, the
restriction must leave practically open to the speaker, or as open
as the now restricted alternative would have been, at least one
alternative that, from all relevant persons' standpoints, is not
significantly less promotive, overall, of the relevant free speech
values.
Of course, this approach is not simple. Close, difficult cases
involving obscure value tradeoffs may arise. The restricted
147. See Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 470-73 (1985).
148. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 87, at 878-79.
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speech channel may offer a broad audience, and the proffered
alternative greater articulateness, creating problems of commen-
surability. But in the broad run of cases, it will be reasonably
clear that some equivalent speech channel exists. However, the
audience might be substantially smaller, or the message substan-
tially distorted, or some other substantial deficiency in free
speech value terms might be present. If theoretical problems re-
main, they are problems that cannot be avoided on any more
complex, multifaceted theory than that argued for in this
Article.
